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ABSTRACT
Research on the asymmetric effect of negative versus positive affective states (induced
by gains or losses) on scope of attention, both at a perceptual and a conceptual level, is
abundant. However, little is known about themoderating effect of anticipating gains or
losses versus actually experiencing them and about any downstream consequences of
these effects on goal-directed behaviour. In two studies, we show that gains versus
losses induce qualitatively different processes. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that
the anticipation of monetary gains results in a narrowing of attentional scope, while
experiencing gains broadens the scope of attention. We find the reverse pattern
concerning monetary losses – while anticipation of monetary losses results in
broadening of attentional scope, the actual experience of losses results in narrowing
of attentional scope. Additionally, Experiment 2 replicates these findings and shows
how differential attentional tuning as a function of the anticipation versus experience
of gains versus losses modulates priming-induced goal-directed behaviour.
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The question is not what you look at, but what you see.
(Henry David Thoreau ([Journal, 5 August 1851])
Do people process information differently depend-
ing on whether their current affective state is induced
by gains or losses? Do they miss the forest for the trees
as a function of feeling positive due to expecting or
experiencing gains or, conversely, feeling negative
when they anticipate or actually experience losses?
As previous research shows, people can either
attune to and process information at a fine-grained,
restricted, detailed level or at a more global, broader
level, both perceptually (Gable et al., 2015; Huntsinger
& Huntsinger, 2013; Uddenberg et al., 2015) and con-
ceptually (Fredrickson et al., 2005; Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2010c; Gable et al., 2015; Harmon-Jones et al.,
2013; Kaplan et al., 2012). This narrowing versus
broadening of attentional scope is known as “atten-
tional tuning” (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011). Interest-
ingly, research to date appears to be equivocal with
regard to the influence of positive versus negative
affective states on attentional scope. While some
findings demonstrate broadening of attentional
scope for positive affective states, such as amusement
or happiness (Fredrickson et al., 2005; Rowe et al.,
2007), other research shows that other such states
could result in narrowing of attentional scope (e.g.
desire, Levine et al., 2009). In a similar vein, some nega-
tive (hypervigilant) states, such as fear or anger, have
been shown to narrow attentional scope (Dhinakaran
et al., 2013; Gable et al., 2015; Hüttermann et al., 2015;
Schmitz et al., 2009), while others, such as sadness,
depression or anhedonia, may broaden attentional
scope (Brailean et al., 2014; Gable & Harmon-Jones,
2010b; von Hecker et al., 2005). Still other findings
point to inconsistent effects of affective states on
attentional scope (e.g. Finucane et al., 2007; Hunt-
singer & Huntsinger, 2012; Huntsinger et al., 2010).
These mixed findings may in part be attributable to
the observation that examining the influence of
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discrete emotions on attentional scope can some-
times result in confounding their valence (positive
vs. negative) with other properties, such as arousal,
or with their motivational intensity, thus hampering
straightforward inferences on the impact of positive
versus negative states on attentional tuning
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2013).
In the present paper, we aim to reconcile some of
the conflicting findings by systematically dissociating
positive versus negative affective valence from high
versus low motivational intensity and by examining
how these two factors might interact in affecting
attentional scope. More specifically, our focus is on
examining how attentional scope, both at a percep-
tual and a conceptual level (Posner & Presti, 1987),
is modulated by people’s anticipatory or actually
experienced affective states resulting from either the
anticipation or experience of monetary gains, or the
anticipation or experience of monetary losses.
Additionally, we show how attentional scope resulting
from either anticipation or experience of monetary
gains or losses impacts subsequent goal-directed
behaviour as a function of responsiveness to primes
delivered in locations converging with, or diverging
from, one’s currently maintained attentional scope.
This particular approach helps us to identify the dis-
tinctive additive and/or multiplicative (interactive)
effects of affective valence and motivational intensity,
through focusing on the effects of anticipatory versus
experienced affective states on attentional scope not
only for positive affective states as previously demon-
strated (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a, 2011; see also
Nadig et al., 2019), but also for negative affective
states. Moreover, this approach may aid in under-
standing the downstream consequences of gains
versus losses on induced attentional scopes for motiv-
ated behaviour.
Gains, losses and attentional scope
While the literature posits that affective states, the
motivational underpinnings of these affective states
and concomitant attentional processes are all inter-
related, there is a clear lack of consensus with regard
to the underlying mechanism driving the phenom-
enon of attentional tuning. The conventional
account, proposed by Gasper et al. (2002; see also
Friedman et al., 2010), suggests that affective
valence is a critical precursor to narrowing versus
broadening of attentional scope, such that positive
affective valence broadens and negative affective
valence narrows such scope. Indeed, research has
shown, for example, that people experiencing positive
affective states, such as happiness or amusement,
exhibit a broadening of scope (Fredrickson et al.,
2005). More specifically, the broaden-and-build frame-
work of positive emotions (Fredrickson et al., 2005)
suggests that such positive affective states broaden
scope, thereby allowing individuals to pursue a
wider range of actions and possibilities that might
enable them to explore and identify new and
additional resources and opportunities. In contrast,
various negative affective states, such as anger, fear
or disgust, have been found to induce a more nar-
rowed scope, prompting the individual to respond
to environmental threats with acute, task-specific
actions (e.g. to flee or attack; Gable & Harmon-Jones,
2010b; Fredrickson et al., 2005). Yet, as alluded to
above, the findings so far have been mixed. In
addition to inconclusive results (Finucane et al.,
2007; Huntsinger & Huntsinger, 2012; Huntsinger
et al., 2010), further research has indicated that
some positive affective states can narrow attentional
scope, while some negative affective states can
broaden it. Rather than helping the individual identify
rewarding new opportunities, it has been suggested
that such broadening of scope under the conditions
of negative affect may aid the individual in under-
standing why previous actions might have been
unsuccessful and exploring more fruitful future
options (see Harmon-Jones et al., 2013 for an
overview).
As a consequence of this equivocal “state of the
science”, the “traditional” perspective of valence-
affecting-scope has recently been challenged by
Gable, Harmon-Jones and colleagues (Gable
& Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Gable et al., 2008; Harmon-
Jones et al., 2011). They propose that many previous
studies have examined discrete emotions that have
confounded affective valence with motivational inten-
sity (i.e. the urge to move toward/away from a stimu-
lus) and they argue that the latter rather than the
former is the critical factor underlying attentional
tuning. In particular, Gable and Harmon-Jones
(2010a, 2011) investigated the influence of the moti-
vational intensity of particular positive affective
states, such as monetary gains, on attentional
scope, while keeping affective valence constant.
They demonstrated that states of higher motivational
intensity, i.e. when people anticipate monetary
rewards, produce a more narrowed attentional
scope compared to states of lower motivational
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intensity, i.e. when people actually experience such
monetary rewards. Hence, this particular stream of
investigation suggests that it is the urge or desire
for the gain rather than the actual experience of the
gain that induces (constricted) attentional tuning
rather than the affective valence per se. The rationale
behind this phenomenon suggests that the increased
motivational intensity as a function of anticipation of
gain narrows the attentional scope to aid in task-
specific reward acquisition. This narrowing of atten-
tional scope occurs at both a perceptual and a con-
ceptual level – people not only focus predominantly
on central rather than peripheral cues in the visual
field, but they also form a narrower, more restricted
range of associations in their long-term memory
(Anderson et al., 1994; Gable et al., 2011). The
reduced motivational intensity experienced after a
reward has been successfully attained, in contrast,
promotes a broadening of attentional scope, both
at the perceptual and the conceptual level. Broaden-
ing of attentional scope involves a shift from a
restricted focus on the centre of sensory perception
to include peripheral stimuli and it is thought to
assist people in the search for new opportunities
present in the environment (Fredrickson et al., 2005;
Harmon-Jones et al., 2011).
Since affective valence and motivational intensity
are conceptually distinct constructs, which frequently
become confounded when studying discrete
emotions, the question becomes imperative as to
whether these two factors are independent or interde-
pendent when it comes to their impact on attentional
scope and thus whether they exert additive or multi-
plicative (interactive) effects. While studies on the
motivational intensity constitute an important step
forward, it is striking to note that to date there is still
no work that has systematically varied both affective
valence (positive vs. negative) and motivational inten-
sity (low vs. high) simultaneously, examining their
additive and interactive effects on attentional tuning:
a void the present research aims to fill.
Indeed, the previous work that addressed the role
of motivational intensity has been largely confined
to addressing differences in motivational intensity
within the spectrum of positively valenced affective
states, while research on negative states has focused
on discrete emotions, which vary according to many
more dimensions than simply their intensity (e.g.
sadness vs. disgust, Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a).
Hence, it is unclear if, and to what extent, similar pro-
cesses may occur for negatively valenced affective
states which vary in nothing more than their motiva-
tional intensity. At first glance, the answer to this ques-
tion may seem to be a straightforward affirmative;
however, different streams of literature actually
suggest qualitatively different processes, thus indicat-
ing diverging expectations for positive versus nega-
tive affective states. Hence, exploring this question
can have important repercussions for our understand-
ing of positive versus negative affective states of
differing motivational intensity and their respective
impact on attentional scope and its downstream con-
sequences. By replicating and extending past research
(Gable & Harmon Jones, 2010a), we will zoom in on
positive versus negative affective valence through
contrasting (monetary) gains with losses. Additionally,
we will concentrate on different levels of motivational
intensity by contrasting the anticipation of these gains
and losses with the actual experience of them.
How affective valence and motivational
intensity may interact
There are various reasons to assume that the effects of
anticipation versus experience affective states on
attentional scope may not be symmetrical for gains
versus losses. First, the phenomenon of loss aversion
– the idea that “losses loom larger than gains” –
already suggests such asymmetry (Kahneman et al.,
1979). While previous research has shown that the
anticipation of gains narrows attentional scope com-
pared to the experience of gains (Gable & Harmon
Jones, 2010a), the literature does not appear unequi-
vocal on whether the anticipation or experience of
losses may produce similar effects on attentional
scope (Dhinakaran et al., 2013; Sugimoto et al.,
2007). At least two contrasting perspectives may be
put forward: one that suggests a difference in the
strength of the effect of motivational state (antici-
pation vs. experience) as a function of gains versus
losses, and another that points to differences in the
direction of the effect.
With regard to the first perspective, research on the
impact bias (the misprediction of the duration and
intensity of an affectively valenced experience,
Buehler et al., 2001; Gilbert et al., 2002; Wilson &
Gilbert, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000) would lead to the
expectation of an ordinal interaction between motiva-
tional state (anticipation vs. experience) and type of
outcome (gains vs. losses) on attentional scope, with
more pronounced effects expected for motivational
state under conditions of losses compared to gains.
COGNITION AND EMOTION 1441
More specifically, the tendency of people to overesti-
mate the anticipated impact of various life events
(Schkade et al., 1998), particularly for negative states
(the negativity bias, Baumeister et al., 2001; Ito et al.,
1998; Rozin et al., 2001; Vaish et al., 2008) would
imply that the motivational intensity of anticipating
losses would be particularly large and possibly larger
than the motivational intensity of anticipating gains.
Thus, attentional scope in states of anticipation may
narrow more for losses than for gains. Furthermore,
the stronger tendency to overestimate the anticipated
impact of a negative event than a positive one also
implies that once a loss is actually experienced, the
experience itself has a higher likelihood to be less
intense than what was anticipated, which may
produce feelings of relaxation and relief (Levine
et al., 2009). If this is true, then the postulated motiva-
tional intensity of experiencing losses may be even
less than the motivational intensity of experiencing
gains, implying that loss experience states may yield
broader attentional scopes than gain experience
states. In sum, these notions would imply that the
motivational intensity of anticipation would be stron-
ger, that the motivational intensity of experience
would be weaker for losses than for gains, and that
the impact of motivational state (anticipation vs.
experience) on attentional scope would therefore be
more pronounced for losses than for gains.
But this predicted ordinal interaction constitutes
only one possibility. A second, rival perspective
could also be proposed – one that would actually
lead to opposite predictions about the impact of moti-
vational state (anticipation vs. experience) for gains
versus losses. This perspective takes the previously
validated assumptions underlying the motivational
intensity of anticipating versus experiencing gains as
a baseline (Gable & Harmon Jones, 2010a), but chal-
lenges the previous assumptions underlying the moti-
vational intensity of anticipating versus experiencing
losses and suggests a reverse pattern. Several traces
of evidence actually seem to point in that direction.
First, with regard to the anticipation of losses, there
are reasons to assume that its concomitant motiva-
tional intensity may be less pronounced than the pre-
vious account would predict.
More precisely, work on overoptimism and wishful
thinking (Krizan et al., 2009) demonstrates that people
are sometimes prone to underestimate the likelihood
of future undesirable outcomes (see Van Dijk et al.,
2003; Vosgerau, 2010). If so, this may lead to lower
rather than higher motivational intensity for
anticipating future losses. Thus, following this reason-
ing, attentional scope in the anticipation states may
actually broaden for losses, which might help the indi-
vidual monitor the environment for other sources of
reward. Conversely, such wishful thinking may actually
amplify the “pain of losing” once it is actually experi-
enced, so experiencing losses may induce higher, not
lower, motivational intensity than anticipating losses,
which implies that loss experience states would yield
narrower attentional scopes than loss anticipation
states. Compatible with this notion, the related work
does indeed suggest that actually experiencing
losses rather than merely anticipating them engen-
ders increased and intense levels of frustration and
arousal (Angus et al., 2019; Vaish et al., 2008;
Yechiam et al., 2013). Strikingly, additional studies
suggest that the intensity of experienced losses
remains invariably high over a sequence of consecu-
tive losses, suggesting that experiencing multiple
losses does not lead to habituation (Breiter et al.,
2001; Kringelbach et al., 2004). Moreover, the basic
notion of loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 1979), and
much of the work on its ensuing consequence of
risk seeking, also points to the possibility that within
the loss domain, it is not the mere anticipation, but
the actual experience of losses that “hits harder”. For
example, Andrade et al. (2009) have demonstrated
that the typical response to the actual experience
rather than anticipation of losses is qualitatively
different to the response following the experience
rather than anticipation of gains. Their research
focused on sequential gambling following an
outcome planning (anticipation) and experience
state. They demonstrated that while the anticipation
versus the experience of gains did not affect
people’s gambling strategies, it proved consequential
for losses. More specifically, after experiencing rather
than merely anticipating losses people’s gambling
strategies became markedly riskier. Thus, it is well con-
ceivable that the motivational intensity of experiencing
losses is higher than the motivational intensity of
merely anticipating them. If so, then our previously
presented reasoning may actually be turned on its
head and yield the opposite expectation. Hence, in
contrast to gains, it may well be that in the loss
domain, it is not the anticipation but rather the
actual experience of a loss that may trigger the nar-
rower scope of attention (see Table 1).
Thus, this perspective would hold that, in line with
Gable et al. (2011), for gains one would expect antici-
pation to yield increased narrowing in attentional
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scope compared to actual experience. For losses, in
contrast, one would now expect that actual experi-
ence would yield increased narrowing in attentional
scope compared to mere anticipation. In sum, these
predictions would imply observing not an ordinal,
but a disordinal, crossover interaction in which the
direction rather than the strength of the effect of
motivational state (anticipation versus experience)
on attentional scope would be modulated as a func-
tion of the type of outcome (gains versus losses).
To recapitulate, in the present work, we aim to
reconcile some of the conflicting findings by systema-
tically dissociating positive versus negative affective
valence from high versus low motivational intensity
and by examining how the two factors might interact
in affecting attentional scope. More specifically, we
will explore two competing hypotheses regarding
the differential influence of anticipating versus experi-
encing monetary gains or losses on attentional scope
and its downstream consequences for goal-directed
behaviour. When following research on the impact
bias (Wilson et al., 2000), the pattern of anticipating
versus experiencing losses should be comparable to
that observed for gains, only “steeper”, as in more pro-
nounced. Hence, from that perspective, and in line
with Gable and Harmon-Jones’ (2011) findings for
gains, the anticipation of losses should similarly
induce a narrower scope of attention than the experi-
ence of losses and the difference between anticipation
and experience of losses should be larger than for
gains.
The alternative perspective, rooted in work on
overoptimism, wishful thinking and the recent work
on the behavioural and attentional consequences of
experiencing losses (Andrade et al., 2009; Angus
et al., 2019; Yechiam et al., 2013) would yield the
expectation that compared to gains, the pattern for
losses would reverse, i.e. result in a narrower
attentional scope, when people experience rather
than anticipate losses.
Additionally, we will examine any downstream con-
sequences of attentional scope resulting from either
the anticipation or experience of monetary gains or
losses. Given that narrowed attentional scope is
associated with increased motivational intensity, it
makes sense to expect that such a narrowed scope
may impact subsequent goal-directed judgment and
decision-making and that it will do so as a function
of the extent to which one is exposed to goal-relevant
stimuli (primes) delivered in locations converging
with, or diverging from, one’s currently maintained
attentional scope. Building on the findings demon-
strating that centre-focused attention focused affects
decision-making to the largest extent (Atalay et al.,
2012; Tatler & Tatler, 2007), we expect that particularly
centrally located primes will unobtrusively shape sub-
sequent attitudes and behaviours, but only if they are
attended to, thus when the attentional scope is
narrow.
The present research
We test our hypotheses in two lab experiments, inves-
tigating how the anticipation versus experience of
monetary gains or losses modulates attentional
scope, both at a perceptual and conceptual level.
Experiment 1 begins with testing our expectations
particularly for perceptual attention. For our work,
we adapted and extended a variation of the so
called Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task (Knutson
et al., 2000, 2001) developed by Gable and Hamon-
Jones (2010a, 2011; see also Nadig et al., 2019). In
this paradigm, participants either anticipate or actually
attain a monetary reward as a function of task per-
formance using multiple trials. As part of the task,
and per trial, attentional scope is measured, for
example using a Navon task (Gable & Harmon-Jones,
2010a, 2011; Nadig et al., 2019). The size of the
reward is constant across conditions, only the antici-
pation/attainment of it varies. Hence, the task keeps
the valence of the (positive) affective state constant
(since it always involves the same monetary reward),
but varies the motivational intensity (since the motiva-
tional intensity of anticipating the reward is larger
than of attaining it). Extending this paradigm, we not
only varied the anticipation/experience of monetary
rewards, but also of monetary losses, and we
gauged attentional scope using reaction times
during a Navon task (Navon & Navon, 1977) to
Table 1. Summary of hypotheses regarding the influence of monetary










Note: The table summarises expectations of the influence of both
earning potential (gain vs. loss) and motivational state (anticipation
vs. experience) on attentional scope.
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measure attentional scope at the perceptual level
(Förster et al., 2006; Friedman et al., 2010; Gable &
Harmon-Jones, 2010a, 2011; Hicks et al., 2012). In
this way, we are able to specifically pinpoint
whether people process visual information in a fine-
grained manner, while attending to a limited scope
of information, or whether they become attentive to
a greater range of environmental stimuli as their atten-
tional scope broadens. Moreover, following closely the
established by Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010a, 2011)
experimental paradigm allows us to disentangle the
impact of affective valence on attentional scope
from the influence of motivational intensity.
The second experiment bridges the perceptual and
the conceptual levels of attentional scope by examin-
ing how attentional tuning guides consecutive goal
pursuit and governs responsiveness to goal-relevant
priming procedures. To this end, we examine the
effectiveness of goal-relevant primes (Karremans
et al., 2006; Strahan et al., 2002) delivered either in
the central or peripheral scope of vision. In Experiment
2, we not only replicate the findings from the first
experiment, but we also extend these findings to
downstream consequences for motivated (goal-




For the first experiment, we recruited 123 students
(Mage = 21.42, SD = 2.82; 56 females, 67 males) to par-
ticipate in a lab study that was said to test their per-
formance in a game during which they needed to
conduct the flankers task (Eriksen et al., 1974) – indi-
cating the direction of a middle arrow within an
array of arrows. Three participants did not provide
any correct responses to the local target letters
during our attentional task (Navon task; Navon &
Navon, 1977), therefore, we ended up with 120
usable responses. Participants were randomly
assigned to conditions in a 2 (motivational state:
anticipation vs. experience state) × 2 (monetary
outcome: gains vs. losses) between-subjects design
with the breadth of attentional scope as the main
dependent variable. Participants obtained money or
research credits for participation and they were
informed that there was a possibility to earn extra
money (max. €4.80) during the study based on their
performance in the game. A sensitivity analysis using
G*Power to detect the focal interaction (using a mul-
tiple regression model assessing R2 increase with
three predictors) showed that the sample yielded
80% power to detect a small to medium effect ( f =
.25). Given that this detectable effect is close to the
typical effect size in (social) psychology ( f = .21;
Richard et al., 2003) and falls within the range of
effect sizes ( f = .25 and f = .73) of the two-way inter-
action terms reported previously by Gable et al.
(2011) in their studies exploring the impact of
affective states of varying motivational intensity on
attentional scope by implementing a similar exper-
imental procedure, we conclude that the sample size
offers an acceptable level of power to detect the
tested effects.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to participate in
two types of games – either in a “win” game (gain con-
dition) or a “loss” game (loss condition) in which their
flankers performance would determine their out-
comes. Each game consisted of two types of trials:
non-neutral and neutral. In each non-neutral trial in
the “gain” condition, participants had the opportunity
to win an additional €0.10, up to a total of €4.80,
depending on their flankers performance until the
end of the study. Conversely, participants assigned
to the loss condition started with €4.80 at the begin-
ning of the experiment and they were informed that
they needed to do their best in the flankers task to
keep as much money as possible until the end of
the study. In each non-neutral trial, participants
assigned to the loss condition could lose an additional
€0.10. In the neutral trials, performance in the flankers
task did not determine any additional gains or losses.
The order of the trials was randomised across
participants.
In accordance with previous manipulations of
anticipation and experience states (Gable et al.,
2011), we induced both anticipation and experience
states by altering the order of the tasks that partici-
pants were carrying out in each of the 48 trials of
the game. Each trial consisted of the following fixed
elements:
A. Expectancy cue: at the beginning of each trial,
participants were instructed and exposed to
one of two possible symbols: a neutral symbol
(i.e. a spades symbol) indicating that in the
coming trial no monetary gains or losses should
be expected; or a non-neutral symbol
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representing the possibility of winning or losing
money (depending on the condition) in the
upcoming trial (i.e. a clubs symbol);
B. Navon task (Navon & Navon, 1977): the focal task
for measuring our dependent variable (see below
for details). In each trial, participants saw a large
letter composed of smaller letters (e.g. a large A
composed of small Xs) and were asked to ident-
ify, in a randomised order and as quickly as poss-
ible, either the large letter (global target letter;
responses collected for 24 trials) or the small
letter (local target letter; responses collected for
24 trials) by pressing an assigned key on the key-
board. We collected reaction times in each trial of
the game that, in line with previous research
(Gable et al., 2011), were subsequently used to
assess the breadth of attentional scope. This
task was presented as unrelated to the flankers
task game, in which participants were trying to
either win additional money or prevent any
additional monetary losses, but they were
informed that they should perform it as quickly
and accurately as possible.
C. Flankers task (Eriksen et al., 1974): As stated, par-
ticipants were made to believe that their final
pay-offs (as a function of the gain or loss con-
dition they were in) would depend on their per-
formance during this specific task. In order to
earn additional money or prevent possible
losses, participants were instructed to indicate
the direction of a middle arrow presented in an
array of arrows by pressing the assigned keys as
quickly and accurately as possible;
D. Obtaining feedback about the outcome of the
trial: in each trial, participants received infor-
mation on the screen about any changes in
their total monetary gains.
Participants assigned to the anticipation condition
completed the Navon task after they saw an expect-
ancy cue, but before they engaged in the goal-relevant
flankers task allowing for additional monetary gains
and before they received feedback about any potential
gains or losses. Participants in the experience condition
first conducted the flankers task after they saw the
expectancy cue and obtained feedback about their
monetary gains or losses, and only then did they
perform the Navon task (Gable & Harmon-Jones,
2010a, 2011). The specific order of tasks conducted
across conditions can be seen in Figure 1 (Panel A:
Anticipation States, Panel B: Experience States).
In order to enhance the realism of the game and
avoid unwanted habituation responses, 8 of the 24
trials disconfirmed the initial expectation evoked by
the expectancy cue (see Knutson et al., 2000, e.g. par-
ticipants had a chance to win extra money but ulti-
mately did not win it). Thus, 8 out of 24 potentially
winning versus potentially losing trials yielded no
additional monetary gains or losses when these
were expected to occur. In order to keep the
affective valence constant across conditions, and
due to their expectancy-disconfirming nature, these
8 trials were not included in the analysis. Moreover,
the 24 neutral trials were also excluded from the
analysis, as participants did not experience any gains
or losses resulting from their performance in these
particular trials. Specific trials were assigned before-
hand as gain or loss trials in which participants
would either win or lose irrespective of their reaction
times. Nevertheless, accuracy was always of primary
relevance – providing a wrong answer in the
flankers task in non-neutral trials never led to monet-
ary gains in the “gain” condition and resulted in
additional losses in the “loss” condition.
Dependent measure
In our analysis, we focused on response times (RTs) to
the local letters as the key target due to the fact that
global attentional scope is the default attentional
mode (Huntsinger & Huntsinger, 2012; Kimchi &
Kimchi, 1992; Kimchi et al., 1982; see Table 2 for the
summary of means and standard deviations per con-
dition). The “global precedence” effect (Derryberry &
Reed, 1997; Navon & Navon, 1977) shows that atten-
tional processes are temporally organised and the
default mode with which new information is
approached is the global attentional scope, which
might be further modulated by affective states (Fre-
drickson et al., 2005; Gasper et al., 2002; Schnall
et al., 2008), motivational states (Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2010a, 2011) or environmental cues (Friedman
et al., 2010). Furthermore, innate variability in proces-
sing global information has been observed among
individuals (Zmigrod et al., 2015). As default global
processing mode may obscure meaningful variance
in attentional scope that could be witnessed as a
result of anticipation or experience states of gains
versus losses, we therefore account for this baseline
processing mode while focusing predominantly on 8
trials with local letters as key target responses, control-
ling at the same time for 8 remaining trials in which
the global letters were the response target. Following
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Wang et al. (2017), the inclusion of this covariate in our
analysis is further warranted as it substantially boosts
statistical power while having only a negligible
impact on the probability of Type I error.
Results
To test our interaction between gains versus losses and
anticipation versus experience states, we conducted a
2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses) × 2 (motiva-
tional state: anticipation vs. experience state) analysis
of variance of mean reaction times to local target
letters (8 trials), while controlling for reaction times to
global target letters (8 trials). Only a significant cross-
over interaction between anticipation/experience
states and gains/losses emerged (F(1, 115) = 4.15,
p=.04, η2 = .04; see Figure 2). More specifically, and
replicating previous research (Gable & Harmon-Jones,
2010a, 2011), participants in the gain anticipation
state responded faster to the local target letter (M =
1177.81 ms, SD = 192.68 ms) than participants in the
gain experience state (M = 1250.97 ms, SD =
248.92 ms). Interestingly, in the loss conditions, this
pattern was found to be reversed, i.e. participants pro-
vided quicker responses to the local target letter when
they had already experienced a loss (M = 1182.64 ms,
SD = 361.44 ms), as opposed to participants who
were anticipating a possible monetary loss (M =
1248.20 ms, SD = 559.37 ms; see Figure 2).
Neither of the simple main effects of anticipation
versus experience state within the gain/loss con-
ditions turned out to be significant (for losses: F(1,
Figure 1. Order of tasks conducted in Experiment 1 for anticipation states (Panel A) and experience states (Panel B).






Gain 1.10 (0.19) 1.23 (0.25)
Loss 1.28 (0.56) 1.25 (0.36)
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115) = 1.85, p = .18; for gains: F(1,115) = 2.31, p = .13;
for anticipation states: F(1, 115) = 2.15, p = .15; for
experience states: F(1, 115) = 1.96, p = .16). Thus, the
interaction is driven by the difference in direction of
the simple effects rather than their respective
strengths supporting the inference of a disordinal
rather than ordinal interaction.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 replicate previous research
in demonstrating that attentional scope narrows for
the positive affective states of high motivational inten-
sity, i.e. for the anticipation of monetary gains (Gable &
Harmon-Jones, 2010a, 2011). Moreover, we contribute
to previous research by providing support for our
alternative expectations regarding the attentional
tuning induced by the anticipation versus the experi-
ence of losses. When it comes to monetary losses, we
observe narrower attention when one actually experi-
ences rather than merely anticipates losses.
In our second experiment, we extend these
findings by examining the impact of gain- versus
loss-induced attentional scope for subsequent goal
pursuit.
Experiment 2
Our second experiment builds on Experiment 1 while
not only replicating, but also extending our findings.
We expand our investigation to the domain of concep-
tual attentional scope, exploring alongside the effects
of affective and motivational states on perceptual
attention their interactive effects on the scope of con-
ceptual attention. We employ priming procedures (i.e.
unconscious effects of memory whereby identifi-
cation, production or usage of an item is improved
by an earlier encounter; Levy et al., 2004) as their effec-
tiveness depends on the scope of both conceptual
and perceptual attention (Spruyt et al., 2009). For
this experiment, we selected thrift primes (e.g. sales,
promotions, Chartrand et al., 2008) that are goal-rel-
evant for the motivational states (anticipation vs.
experience) accompanying the affective states
induced by monetary gains or monetary losses.
Research to date has demonstrated that the goal-
relevance of primes is a crucial factor influencing
their effectiveness (Karremans et al., 2006). Nonethe-
less, in accordance with our theorising, not only goal-
relevance, but also the specific location of the prime
should determine whether primes become effective
or not. Due to the fact that attention focused on the
visual centre has been demonstrated to have the great-
est impact on decision-making (Atalay et al., 2012;
Chandon et al., 2009; Tatler & Tatler, 2007), we expect
that central rather than peripheral primes will exert
the strongest influence on decision-making in states
of high motivational intensity.
In line with the findings from Experiment 1, we posit
greater receptivity to centrally delivered goal-relevant
primes for monetary gains when the gains are antici-
pated rather than experienced, i.e. under the conditions
of narrowed attentional scope. In contrast, building on
the findings of Experiment 1, we expect this pattern to
reverse for monetary losses: due to increased narrow-
ing of attentional scope under conditions of experien-
cing rather than anticipating losses we predict to
observe higher susceptibility to centrally-delivered
goal-relevant primes particularly in the loss experience
rather than the loss anticipation state.
Based on previous research (Chartrand et al., 2008),
we investigated in which circumstances exposure to
thrift primes (words such as sales, promotion) would
affect the subsequent pursuit of thrift goals (the goal
of saving money). In line with prior studies demon-
strating that exposure to thrift primes increases prefer-
ence for cheaper products (Chartrand et al., 2008), we
assessed the effectiveness of thrift primes by measur-
ing willingness-to-pay for a set of daily-used products
(in Euros; Ariely et al., 2003; Festjens et al., 2014). Will-
ingness-to-pay is not a direct measure of behaviour,
but a behavioural intention measure (Ajzen et al.,
1992). As goal pursuit is defined as a motivated behav-
iour to attain desired end states (Dik et al., 2007),
Figure 2. Mean reaction times (in milliseconds, ms) to local target
letters during Navon task over 8 trials, using mean reaction times to
global target letters as a covariate (8 trials). Error bars denote one stan-
dard error around the mean.
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which is prompted by behavioural intentions (Ajzen &
Ajzen, 1991), willingness-to-pay can be considered an
appropriate measure to capture the impact of
exposure to thrift primes on subsequent goal pursuit
(Chartrand et al., 2008). Indeed, it has been widely
used in previous research to tap into the impact of
experimental manipulations on the pursuit of such
goals as reward-seeking (Festjens et al., 2014), main-
tenance of social status (Pettit et al., 2010) or restor-
ation of self-image (Sivanathan et al., 2010).
Method
Participants and design
We submitted effect sizes based on a recent meta-
analysis investigating the behavioural effect of inciden-
tally-presented words ( f = .18; Weingarten et al., 2016)
to an a priori power analysis (Faul et al., 2009), setting
power to 0.80 at α = 0.05. As a result, we obtained a
minimum required sample size of 256 participants for
the target 3-way interaction (see next). We used this
as a minimum and decided to continue data collection
for as long as the allotted lab time and resources would
allow us, ultimately yielding a total of 567 participants
(Mage = 21.25, SD = 3.05; 251 males, 316 females)
during two independent data collection moments.
The lab experiment was advertised as two unrelated
studies about games and memory. Participants
received money or research credits for participation.
Additionally, they were informed that there was a
possibility to earn extra money (max. €4) during the
study. Participants were randomly assigned to con-
ditions in a 2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses) × 2
(motivational state: anticipation vs. experience state)
× 2 (location of the prime: central vs. peripheral)
between-subjects design with the willingness-to-pay
(in Euro) for a set of daily-used products as the main
dependent variable.
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment on a 19-inch
computer screen. The experiment consisted of two
main parts: the memory task (during which partici-
pants were primed) and the game that allowed us to
assign participants to either gain or loss conditions.
In line with the previous study, for the games part of
the study, participants were asked to play a game
during which they were asked to do their best to
either win (gain) or keep (loss) a certain amount of
money. Participants assigned to the gain anticipation
versus experience condition were told that they
would be able to earn extra money, up to a
maximum of €4.00. In contrast, participants assigned
to the loss conditions learned that they would start
the game with €4.00 and could lose an additional
€0.40 in each trial. Participants played 10 rounds of
the flankers task (Eriksen et al., 1974; see experiment
1 for details) and were asked to respond as quickly
yet accurately as possible in order to beat the
average reaction times obtained during the same
task by students from their university during a pre-
test (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a, 2011).
Similarly to experiment 1, the order of the tasks
differed across conditions. Participants assigned to
the experience conditions first completed 10 rounds
of the flankers task, were then informed about their
performance in the set of 10 flankers tasks and only
later were they primed during an ostensible
memory task. For the participants assigned to the
anticipation conditions, the order of these tasks was
reversed and the memory task preceded the set of
10 flankers tasks (see Figure 3 for specific order of
tasks, Panel A: Anticipation States, Panel B: Experience
States).
During the ostensible memory task, aimed at
priming participants with thrift-related concepts, par-
ticipants were exposed to 24 words. These words
were flashed for a brief moment (0.5 s) on the
screen. We varied the location of the words as a
between-subjects factor. For half of the participants,
words were presented in the central scope of vision
(i.e. centre of the screen); for the remaining ones,
words were presented in the peripheral scope of
vision (thus in each of the four corners of the
screen). The order of words was randomised across
participants. The six words (promotion, sale, discount,
bargain, reduction, deal; Chartrand et al., 2008) that
were shown during the memory task were the goal-
relevant primes. The 18 remaining words were
neutral words selected from the Affective Norms of
English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999; e.g.
bench, procedure, pollen, oil, etc.).
In reality, gains or losses were not determined by
the participants’ performance – certain trials were pro-
grammed as winning or losing trials in order to keep
the total monetary compensation stable across the
conditions. As a result, each participant left the lab
with an additional pay-off of €2. The sequence of
trials was randomised across participants. Funnelled
debriefing indicated that participants were not suspi-
cious about our manipulations related to gains
versus losses.
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Dependent measure
Afterwards, participants were asked to indicate their
willingness-to-pay (in Euro) for several daily-used,
unbranded products – a loaf of bread, orange juice
(1 L), bananas (1 kg), an apple pie, etc. (Ariely et al.,
2003; Festjens et al., 2014; see Table 3 for the
summary of means and standard deviations per con-
dition). All willingness-to-pay values were sub-
sequently summed up. The order of products for
which the willingness-to-pay was requested was ran-
domised. Funnelled debriefing indicated that none
of the participants indicated awareness of any connec-
tion between the memory task and the willingness-to-
pay questions.
To corroborate the cover story, we concluded this
task with a short memory test, during which partici-
pants were asked to list words that had previously
been flashed on the screen.
Results
We excluded one participant who indicated outlying
WTP measures (±3SD from the sample mean; Mis-
chkowski et al., 2018; Park et al., 2015) across multiple
products. To test whether primes are especially
effective when they are delivered in accordance with
the currently maintained attentional scope, we
Figure 3. Order of tasks conducted in Experiment 2 for anticipation states (Panel A) and experience states (Panel B).
Table 3. Summary of Means and Standard Deviations per condition in
Experiment 2.





Central Gain 2.03 (0.71) 2.28 (1.47)
Loss 2.25 (0.88) 1.95 (0.62)
Peripheral Gain 2.14 (0.74) 2.11 (0.76)
Loss 2.17 (0.74) 2.20 (0.73)
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conducted a 2 (motivational state: anticipation vs.
experience) × 2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses)
× 2 (location of the prime: central vs. peripheral) analy-
sis of variance on the aggregated willingness-to-pay
measure collected for the four unbranded products.1
In accordance with our expectations, a three-way
interaction between anticipation versus experience
states, gains versus losses and the location of the
primes (central vs. peripheral) reached statistical sig-
nificance (F(1, 558) = 5.10, p = .02, η2 = .01). No
other effects were statistically significant. We further
probed the interaction to investigate which simple
two-way interaction within the above-mentioned
three-way interaction was significant depending on
the location of the primes. In line with our expec-
tations, a simple two-way interaction between motiva-
tional state and monetary outcome turned out to be
significant for the centrally delivered primes (F(1,
564) = 7.28, p = .01), while the same two-way inter-
action failed to reach significance for primes that
were delivered peripherally (F(1, 564) = 0.07, p = .79).
We further decomposed the three-way interaction
to conduct a simple main effects analysis to achieve
a more comprehensive understanding of the ident-
ified three-way interaction. This analysis corroborated
the findings that the presented pattern of the three-
way interaction resulted from responsiveness to
central rather than peripheral primes. When partici-
pants were exposed to primes in the central scope
of their vision, they indicated lower willingness when
gains were still anticipated (M = 2.03, SD = 0.71) in con-
trast to gain experience states (M = 2.28, SD = 1.47; F(1,
558) = 2.94, p = .09), indicating higher responsiveness
to thrift-related primes in the gain anticipation states.
In contrast, for losses the effect of centrally presented
primes reversed with participants being more suscep-
tible to the effects of such primes in the loss experi-
ence (M = 1.95, SD = 0.62) rather than in the loss
anticipation state (M = 2.25, SD = 0.88; F(1, 558) =
4.38, p = .04). Conversely, for peripherally delivered
primes the motivational state did not affect WTP for
presented products neither for monetary gains
(Manticipation = 2.14, SD = 0.74; Mexperience = 2.11, SD =
0.76; F < 1), nor for monetary losses (Manticipation =
2.17, SD = 0.74; Mexperience = 2.20, SD = 0.73; F < 1).
Interestingly, the pattern of the interaction
between motivational state (anticipation vs. experi-
ence) and monetary outcome (gains vs. losses) con-
ceptually replicated the disordinal interaction
presented in Experiment 1. Participants became
responsive to centrally presented thrift primes
particularly under the conditions of high motivational
intensity, thus in gain anticipation or loss experience
states, when attentional scope was shown to narrow
(see Figure 2). In these conditions, participants were
more likely to respond in line with the implications
of the thrift prime (see Figures 4 and 5).
General discussion
By means of two lab experiments, we confirmed our
notions regarding the influence of monetary gains
versus losses on attentional scope and the influence
of attentional tuning on consecutive goal pursuit.
We demonstrated a disordinal interaction between
monetary gains versus losses and anticipation versus
Figure 5. Willingness-to-pay measures indicated after exposure to
peripherally located primes. Error bars denote one standard error
around the mean.
Figure 4. Willingness-to-pay measures indicated after exposure to
centrally located primes. Error bars denote one standard error
around the mean.
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experience states. Replicating previous research
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a, 2011), we corrobo-
rated the findings that attentional scope narrows
when monetary gains are anticipated, whereas it
broadens with the experience of monetary gains. We
showed that the experience rather than the antici-
pation of losses, results in a narrowing of attentional
scope. Subsequently, attentional scope further deter-
mines which priming procedures are effective and
which are inconsequential for judgment and
decision-making. We found that centrally presented
goal-relevant primes particularly affect people when
they are shown under conditions of narrow atten-
tional scope – when gains are anticipated or when
losses have been experienced.
Our findings support the recent stream in the litera-
ture that concentrates on the qualitative difference
between anticipation and experience of losses
(Andrade et al., 2009, 2014; Boyce et al., 2013).
Despite the fact that loss aversion has been shown
to be an information processing bias that falls under
the umbrella term of affective forecasting errors
(Kermer et al., 2006), our findings support the alterna-
tive account that presents loss aversion as a phenom-
enon that occurs also in the experience state. More
specifically, we demonstrate that immediate cognitive
reaction to loss experience – narrowing of attentional
scope – occurs when losses have been experienced,
but not when they are merely anticipated. The litera-
ture on affective forecasting errors often incorporates
longer temporal perspectives on loss experience,
taking into consideration people’s lack of awareness
of cognitive mechanisms (rationalisations, Gilbert
et al., 1998), attenuating the detrimental impact of
negative affective states over a longer time frame.
Such mechanisms are part of the psychological
immune system (Gilbert et al., 1998), operating fre-
quently without conscious awareness. Nonetheless,
research also shows that, for instance, experienced
losses in income significantly diminish subjective
well-being (Boyce et al., 2013). These findings chal-
lenge straightforward expectations that could be
derived for attentional processes from research on
impact bias (Wilson et al., 2000) and dovetail nicely
with Loewenstain’s hot-cold empathy gap (1996);
the work on overoptimism and wishful thinking
(Krizan et al., 2009); and research on human behaviour
in the gambling context (Andrade et al., 2009). Thus,
we demonstrate that despite the fact that people
tend to anticipate that losses are difficult to cope
with, sometimes they significantly mispredict their
instant emotional and subsequent cognitive reactions.
In this research, we specifically examined what
happens to instant cognitive reactions – how atten-
tional scope is shaped by the anticipation and experi-
ence of both gains and losses. The immediate
narrowing of attentional scope could be discerned
as a functional psychological mechanism, aimed at cir-
cumventing any potential future losses, which, on the
basis of experience, are seen as hurtful and conse-
quently undesirable.
Additionally, our research contributes to the discus-
sion regarding the processes that guide the atten-
tional tuning phenomenon. At first, our results could
be seen as contradicting Levine and Edelstein’s the-
ories (2009). Levine et al. (2009) classified emotions
into two major categories: (1) pre-goal emotions (e.g.
desire or anger), reflecting the appraisal that goal-
directed actions will need to be taken in the near
future; and (2) post-goal emotions (e.g. happiness or
sadness), indicating that successful goal attainment
or goal failure has already occurred. Building on this
framework, follow-up research showed that pre-goal
emotions induce attentional narrowing, whereas
post-goal emotions evoke the broadening of attention
(Kaplan et al., 2012). In line with this research stream,
we could expect that pre-goal negative states (e.g.
loss anticipation states) will consequently lead to
attentional narrowing, whereas post-goal negative
states (loss experience states) will elicit broadening
of attentional scope.
Nonetheless, the literature to date lacks an obvious
consensus with regard to the impact of negative
affective states on attentional scope. An alternative
account proposes that negative states could result in
hypervigilance (Quenette, 1990) inducing broadening
rather than narrowing of attentional scope (Eysenck
et al., 1992; Rossi et al., 2013; Shackman et al., 2011;
Somerville et al., 2010; Weymar et al., 2014). Our
findings demonstrating broadening of attentional
scope in the loss anticipation state align with the
research showing that negative states induce hypervi-
gilance resulting in greater environmental scanning
and broad attentional scope prior to the detection of
a potential source of this particular negative state
(Eysenck et al., 1992). What is even more interesting
is that hypervigilance was observed in previous
research particularly for negative affective states
characterised by uncertainty, such as threat (Weymar
et al., 2014) or anxiety (Shackman et al., 2011).
People in the loss anticipation states are also highly
uncertain about the outcomes of their impending
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goal pursuit – after hearing that potential losses might
happen in the near future they have no possibility of
estimating the likelihood of such an event to
happen. In contrast, upon loss experience people
can verify their beliefs with reality while comparing
their expectations regarding experiencing losses
with the actual experience of losses. The narrowing
of attentional scope following the experience of
losses is an instance of a rapid cognitive reaction to
an uneasy experience of monetary losses, upon the
realisation of the intensity and severity of such nega-
tively-valenced “hot states” (Loewenstein & Loewen-
stein, 1996). While diverting from direct expectations
that could be derived from previous research (Levine
et al., 2009), we demonstrate that our perception of
the attentional tuning process should not be plainly
one-dimensional. Losses should be considered as
unique experiences that attune the attentional scope
in their own distinctive way.
Interestingly, our findings relating to both antici-
pation and experience of losses nicely dovetail with
the defence cascade models that clarify the defensive
behaviour of animals (Fanselow & Fanselow, 1994;
Lang et al., 1997, 2000). These models demonstrate
that when signals of threats in the environment are
present but no specific source of threat has yet been
detected, the pre-encounter, threat-unspecific hyper-
vigilance occurs – the attentional scope broadens so
that an organism can process a wider scope of infor-
mation and identify the exact source of threat. As
soon as the threat is detected, the post-encounter
stage follows, characterised by active defensive
behaviour mainly concentrated on the fight or flight
response (Keil et al., 2010). Overlapping findings with
regard to attentional processes and defence mechan-
isms in humans were presented by Weymar et al.
(2014) who showed both pre-encounter and post-
encounter hypervigilance in spider-phobic individuals.
Furthermore, Eysenck (1991), while investigating
attentional processes in anxious people, also observed
first the stage of general hypervigilance through
broad environmental scanning which subsequently
transformed into enhanced selective attention. Such
attentional cascade – broad attentional scope fol-
lowed by narrowed attentional scope – maps onto
our results for losses. In the loss anticipation states,
when losses are uncertain, broad attentional scope
helps people prevent uncertain losses from happen-
ing. Conversely, narrower attentional scope after
losses have been experienced results from both the
severity of such experience and the realisation that a
more active behavioural response, either in the form
of fight or flight, with a greater focus on details
might be more beneficial in the future.
Our results are additionally compatible with
Wachtel and Wachtel’s (1967) curvilinear (inverted U-
shape) relationship between attention and perform-
ance, since our findings show both the adaptive
value of excluding irrelevant cues in the peripheral
field of vision for participants in the loss experience
condition, but also the reverse. That is, the inverted
U-shaped relationship implies that performance will
first improve because irrelevant cues are shut out
but may subsequently deteriorate as goal-relevant
cues also become ignored. We observe the latter
phenomenon in the loss anticipation condition
where target words were presented peripherally and,
indeed, proved not to influence subsequent task per-
formance (i.e. the WTP ratings). Thus, people tend to
disregard goal-relevant primes if they appear
beyond their currently maintained attentional scope,
despite the fact that the primes can assist them in
their subsequent goal pursuit.
The phenomenon of attentional tuning induced by
either gains or losses also helps to qualify the priming
effects introduced so far in the literature. Up to now,
the extensive scope of experimental designs
implemented in previous research delivered primes
in the parafoveal (i.e. peripheral) scope of vision (Char-
trand et al., 1999; Custers et al., 2007; Laran et al., 2011),
especially during subliminal procedures, due to the fact
that such stimuli are processed minimally and outside
of conscious awareness (Nelson et al., 1980). Nonethe-
less, a narrow attentional scope triggers a tunnel vision
effect, as a result of which people are unable to
sufficiently attend to peripheral cues (Gable et al.,
2011; Wadlinger et al., 2006). Therefore, people with
an activated narrow attentional scope are unable to
process peripheral priming procedures and, as a conse-
quence, peripherally delivered primes are not effective.
Hence, this attentional tuning phenomenon should be
perceived as yet another factor moderating the effec-
tiveness of priming procedures.
Note that in contrast to previous research that used
goal-irrelevant peripheral primes (e.g. Chartrand et al.,
1999; Custers et al., 2007; Laran et al., 2011), in our
research we employed goal-relevant primes. Partici-
pants in our studies had a salient goal in mind, particu-
larly when motivational intensity was high, i.e. in both
gain anticipation and loss experience states. In these
states, as a result of increased motivational intensity,
attentional scope narrowed. Consequently, centrally
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rather than peripherally delivered primes should be
more impactful for ensuing judgment and decision-
making in these states, particularly when they are
goal-relevant, which was the case in the present
study. Future research might profitably explore what
types of primes would serve in this role, and where
“goal relevance” ends and “irrelevance” begins. More-
over, future studies may focus on the types of primes
that may be more impactful when attentional scope
broadens, i.e. in gain attainment and loss anticipation
states. Possibly, peripherally delivered primes that
signal novel opportunities (gain attainment) or behav-
ioural alternatives (loss anticipation) may be particu-
larly interesting candidates here.
Furthermore, future research can take into con-
sideration additional relevant factors that can play a
role in the particular theatre of operations of gains
and losses and attentional scope. Additional moderat-
ing variables that have the potential to shape the
attentional scope in the anticipation and experience
states of gains and losses could be: magnitude of
monetary pay-offs (Estle et al., 2006); uncertainty tied
to the monetary pay-offs (Weber & Weber, 1994); or
supraliminal or subliminal exposure to reward or loss
cues (Bijleveld et al., 2010).
Note
1. We excluded two products from our analysis that were
characterised by the highest number of outlying obser-
vations (a black mug) or a stable pattern in data (a
bottle of water). Including these products in the analysis
does not change the pattern of results (three-way inter-
action reaches statistical significance; F(1, 558) = 2.95, p
= .05, η2 = .01).
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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